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Objective:  To promote a more systematic approach to research on uncertainty in health care, 
and to explore promising starting points and future directions for this research. 
 
Methods:  We examine three fundamental aspects of medical uncertainty that a systematic 
research program should ideally address:  its nature, effects, and communication.  We 
summarize key insights from past empirical research and explore existing conceptual models 
that can help guide future research. 
 
Results:   Past research has produced valuable insights on uncertainty in health care, but 
important knowledge gaps remain.  Bridging these gaps will require both more empirical 
evidence and integrative conceptual models that can orient research efforts and promote a 
shared understanding of what uncertainty is, how it affects people, and how and why it should 
be communicated.   
 
Conclusion:   Uncertainty in health care is an extremely important but incompletely understood 
phenomenon.  Moving the field towards a more systematic program of research has great 
potential to advance our understanding, but will require researchers to develop consensus on 
the questions that need to be asked, and to work collaboratively to answer them.  
 
Practice Implications:  A more systematic approach to investigating uncertainty in health care 
can help elucidate how the clinical communication of uncertainty might be improved. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Uncertainty is an essential aspect of human life and an integral problem of medicine.  It is the 
single, common challenge faced by every patient who receives health care and every clinician 
who provides it, as well as the administrators, payers, policymakers, and researchers who 
deliver, finance, regulate, and study it.  In every one of these diverse activities undertaken by 
different stakeholders, uncertainty of one form or another—arising from various sources, 
pertaining to any number of relevant issues, arising in mind, and formed and reformed through 
communication—provides the call to action, and provokes a variety of different responses [1].  
 
Uncertainty in health care is by no means a new topic, but one as old as medicine itself [2].  Yet 
uncertainty in health care has grown in visibility and importance in recent years.  Advances in 
medical science, culminating in the sequencing of the human genome, have produced an ever-
expanding array of new technologies of unproven value.  The evidence-based medicine 
movement has clarified what is known but also unknown about the benefits and harms of a 
growing number of medical interventions, raising professional awareness of scientific ignorance 
[3-6].  At the same time, a growing emphasis on patient engagement and shared decision 
making in health care has begun to extend awareness of this ignorance to patients and 
laypersons.  Broadening dissemination of medical information through both traditional mass 
media and social media channels has extended this awareness even further, to the general 





For a problem of such integral and growing importance, one might expect uncertainty in health 
care to be the focus of its own systematic program of research.  Certainly, the volume of 
research on uncertainty appears to be increasing; a PubMed literature search using 
“uncertainty” as either a MeSH term or a title word demonstrates exponential growth (Figure 
1).  Even a cursory survey of this literature reveals studies spanning the entire spectrum of 
translational research and conducted by investigators representing a variety of disciplines from 
anthropology to zoology.  Most studies have focused on resolving uncertainty about some 
particular issue, rather than investigating uncertainty per se, as an object of inquiry in its own 
right.  Nevertheless, studies focused explicitly on uncertainty have also grown in number and 
diversity. 
 
This growth, however, belies a lack of systematicity:  research on uncertainty has developed 
organically, in an uncoordinated, piecemeal fashion.  This evolutionary path is understandable;   
uncertainty is a complex phenomenon with myriad manifestations, causes, and effects (Box 1).  
No single study, investigator, or discipline can capture all of its complexity.   Yet the lack of 
systematicity also raises problems, as recent reviews of research on the nature of uncertainty 
and the phenomenon of “uncertainty tolerance” have demonstrated [1, 7, 8].  Diversity in 
research generates not only rich insights but confusion and inefficiency.  The same 
phenomenon becomes defined using different terms, and vice versa.  Important conceptual 
assumptions are taken for granted rather than being made explicit.  Studies simply duplicate 
one another rather than asking and answering unique questions, and generate both false-
positive and false-negative empirical findings in terms of their novelty, significance, and true 
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value to the field.  Multiple theories proliferate, each focused on different parts of the 
proverbial elephant, seen through different conceptual lenses and described using different 
languages.  Researchers talk past rather than with one another, and fail to reach a shared 
understanding of what is truly known and not known about the phenomenon [9].   
 
We believe that simply maintaining the status quo only adds to the plethora of disconnected—
and either redundant or unnoticed—findings, concepts, and theories, and impedes 
understanding.  Research on medical uncertainty needs to evolve from an organic and 
piecemeal to a more deliberate, coordinated, integrated program of work.   
 
Of course, absolute systematicity is an unattainable ideal.  The problem of medical uncertainty 
is simply too complex—and the research enterprise too vast—to consolidate within one unified 
research program or theoretical paradigm.  From a pragmatic perspective, furthermore, there is 
no single best program or true paradigm, only more or less useful ones.  Yet we believe at least 
some progress towards greater systematicity is possible and necessary; the alternative is 
perpetual fragmentation in our understanding.  Greater systematicity, however, requires 
meaningful consensus on basic concepts, issues, and research priorities, and collaborative 
engagement of the research community. 
 
The current paper is an attempt to promote these goals.  We examine three fundamental 
aspects of medical uncertainty that we believe a systematic program of research should 
address:  its nature, its effects, and its communication.  These questions correspond, 
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respectively, to three broad research questions.  First, what exactly is uncertainty, and how 
does it originate?  Second, how does uncertainty affect patients, clinicians, and other 
stakeholders?  Third, how—and why—should we communicate uncertainty in health care?  
These questions, we believe, cannot be coherently addressed without a shared understanding 
of key concepts, issues, and priorities, and the goal of this paper is to facilitate such 
understanding.  Towards this end, we present a selective synthesis of conceptual definitions 
and frameworks that we and others have developed in prior literature reviews [1, 7, 9-12].  We 
present these definitions and frameworks not as definitive endpoints for future research, but as 
provisional starting points—descriptive rather than explanatory models that can stimulate and 
guide further theoretical and empirical research on medical uncertainty, and engage the 
broader research community—including behavioral, clinical, communication, and social 
scientists—in these efforts. 
 
2.  The nature of uncertainty in health care 
A precondition for any systematic, integrated program of research is consensus on the nature 
of the phenomenon of interest.  Historically, the nature of uncertainty has been the province of 
numerous disciplines outside of health care—e.g., communication studies, economics, 
mathematics, philosophy, psychology, sociology—and the result has been a rich variety of 
conceptual models [1, 13-16].  In recent years, as the nature of uncertainty as a health care 
phenomenon has become a topic of investigation in its own right, more models have been 
added to the mix [2, 9, 17-22].  The diversity of conceptual models—which cannot be 
adequately summarized here—is the first problem that must be addressed in efforts to make 
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research on medical uncertainty more systematic.  We need some level of agreement on what 
uncertainty represents before we can proceed with investigating how it affects people or how 
we should manage and communicate it. 
 
In approaching this problem we must first acknowledge that all conceptual models are 
simplifying abstractions—incomplete, imperfect, socially constructed representations that 
reflect the assumptions and values of their creators, and serve some defined goal.  From an 
epistemological standpoint they are neither “true” nor “false”—only more or less logically 
coherent or useful for some particular purpose and user.  Any choice between them will always 
be subject to revision.   
 
With this important caveat in mind, we believe it is possible to move towards consensus on a 
basic working definition and conceptual model of medical uncertainty, building on prior work.  
In 2011, Han and colleagues reviewed prior theoretical conceptions in and outside of health 
care [9, 13, 17, 23-27] , and proposed an operational definition of uncertainty as a human 
epistemic state consisting of the conscious, metacognitive awareness of ignorance [1].  
Beginning from this working definition, they developed a conceptual taxonomy that classified 
the varieties of uncertainty in health care according to three fundamental, independent 
dimensions:  1) source, 2) issue, and 3) locus.  The first dimension, source, encompasses 3 
primary phenomena that give rise to uncertainty:  probability, ambiguity, and complexity 
(Figure 2).  Probability (otherwise known as “risk”) represents the fundamental indeterminacy 
or randomness of future outcomes, and leads to what has been termed “aleatory” or “first-
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order” uncertainty; the exemplar is the point estimate of risk (e.g., “20% probability of benefit 
from treatment”).  Ambiguity represents the lack of reliability, credibility, or adequacy of 
information about probability, and engenders what has been termed “epistemic” or “second-
order” uncertainty.  Ambiguity arises in situations in which risk information is unavailable, 
inadequate, or imprecise; the exemplar is the confidence interval around a point estimate (e.g., 
“10-30% probability of benefit from treatment”).  Complexity represents features of risk 
information that make it difficult to understand; examples include conditional relationships, 
interactions, and multiplicity in risk factors, outcomes, or decisional alternatives.     
 
The second dimension, issue, encompasses the substantive outcomes, situations, or 
alternatives to which a given uncertainty (arising from any of the 3 main sources) applies.  
These issues, in turn, can be classified as falling into three main categories—scientific, practical, 
and personal (Figure 3)—which can themselves be further sub-classified.  Personal 
uncertainties, for example, can include uncertainties about personal identity, interpersonal 
relationships, and numerous other social, ethical, and financial issues [28-32].   
 
The third dimension, locus, refers to the particular stakeholder(s) in whose minds uncertainty 
resides.  Figure 4 presents a schema including just two stakeholders (patient and clinician); it 
could be expanded to include others (e.g., family members, other health professionals, 
policymakers).  The schema further simplifies reality in depicting uncertainty as a static, 
categorical, all-or-none phenomenon focused on a single issue.  Notwithstanding these 
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simplifications, the schema illustrates how uncertainty may or may not be shared or equally 
distributed among key stakeholders.   
 
We believe this working definition and three-dimensional model provides a potentially useful, 
logically coherent orienting framework for research and clinical practice.  It can enable 
researchers to more precisely conceptualize uncertainty and investigate its manifestations, 
elemental causes, and effects.  It can help clinicians to more precisely establish the diagnosis 
and prognosis of the uncertainties that arise in different clinical situations, and to more 
deliberately plan and implement interventions to manage them.  It distinguishes between the 
uncertainty of patients, clinicians, or other stakeholders (Figure 4)—a situation that often arises 
from physicians’ reluctance to disclose scientific uncertainty to patients [33, 34]. It can thus 
guide efforts to remediate these discrepancies by various means—e.g., decision support 
interventions aimed at helping patients and physicians achieve a shared awareness of what is 
known and not known. 
 
Like all conceptual models, however, this taxonomy has inherent limitations.  Its level of 
abstraction and specificity may be too high or low for any particular application.  It is not 
exhaustive; it does not include more specific uncertainty sources (e.g., conflicting health 
information and scientific evidence [35]) and issues (e.g., cultural values, moral beliefs, social 
norms, financial and legal concerns), that may be of interest.  At the same time, it makes 
distinctions that may be irrelevant to other users.  It will thus always need to be applied 
flexibly—its scope expanded or contracted, its level of abstraction lowered or raised—based on 
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different user needs.  For example, we recently applied the taxonomy to clinical genome 
sequencing, expanding its precision to identify specific sources and issues of uncertainty 
pertaining to this technology [36].  Applied in this way, the taxonomy can provide a a useful 
starting point to understand the uncertainties manifest in specific clinical problems and has 
begun to be applied in this manner [36-41], although its broader value remains to be 
established.   
 
Furthermore, the taxonomy is purely descriptive; it does not explain the causes of different 
types of uncertainty in health care, which encompass psychological, cultural, and social factors, 
or the processes by which uncertainty is constructed.  It does, however, provide a foundation 
for explanatory models of these processes and the causal relationships between uncertainty 
and other health cognitions and behaviors.  This is an important knowledge gap; of the many 
well-established theories of health behavior, for example, none explicitly include uncertainty—
either in general or in any of its specific varieties—as a key variable [42].  These deficiencies 
reflect the paucity of empirical evidence on the effects of uncertainty, which represents 
another major research priority and the next focus of our analysis. 
 
3.  Effects of uncertainty in health care 
The important question of how uncertainty affects people has been the focus of empirical 
research conducted mostly outside of the domain of health care by social scientists.  This body 
of research is vast and impossible to adequately summarize here, but a general conclusion is 
that uncertainty is typically an aversive phenomenon.  It promotes pessimistic perceptions and 
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judgments, negative affect, fear, and anxiety, indecision, avoidant behaviors, and information 
seeking.  Aversion to probability (risk), ambiguity, and complexity—the three principal sources 
of uncertainty [1]—are well-described phenomena in many domains of life [43-53], including 
health care [8, 54-56], and the avoidance and reduction of uncertainty are considered 
fundamental needs and motivations.[57-62]  
 
Nevertheless, available empirical evidence also suggests that aversive effects of uncertainty are 
not universal, but vary by source of uncertainty (probability, ambiguity, complexity) [63], as well 
as individual and situational characteristics.  This is one of the most important tenets of 
Babrow’s “problematic integration theory” [9, 64, 65], and its corollary argument that 
inattention to these moderating factors leads to overreliance on uncertainty reduction 
strategies, most notably information seeking [66].  Individual characteristics including age, sex, 
education, level of literacy and numeracy, personality traits influence people’s responses to 
uncertainty [7, 46, 67-69].  Influential situational factors include whether potential gains or 
losses are stake; with potential gains, uncertainty may provoke positive emotions,[70] while 
with potential losses, uncertainty may foster hope.[62, 71, 72]  Other situational factors, 
including the urgency of decision making and available time and resources for making a choice, 
may increase aversive responses to uncertainty.[59, 73]  The importance of these various 
factors has been acknowledged in theoretical accounts of medical uncertainty, including 
problematic integration theory [9, 64, 65], Mishel’s “uncertainty in illness theory,”[17, 18], and  
Brasher’s “uncertainty management theory” [71, 74], and Afifi’s “theory of motivated 
information management” [75, 76].  These theories posit that responses to uncertainty 
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ultimately depend on cognitive appraisals, which are influenced by numerous factors including 
the amount and type of available information, and the way in which it is communicated. 
 
A useful construct for understanding not only the varied psychological effects of uncertainty, 
but individual differences in these effects, is the concept of “uncertainty tolerance” (UT).  UT 
has been the focus of a large, diverse body of research undertaken by numerous investigators 
over several decades.[7, 69, 77]  This research has focused largely on assessing individual 
differences in UT, which has been defined and measured in terms of various negative and 
positive cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses.  The guiding assumption has been that 
UT is a stable, trait-level phenomenon, and supportive evidence for this assumption has been 
provided by numerous studies [7, 78-81].   
 
Yet because situational factors also influence people’s responses to uncertainty, UT is 
appropriately conceptualized as not only a stable trait, but a momentary state consisting of 
individuals’ reactions to uncertainty.  We have thus proposed a more expansive, integrative 
working definition of UT:  The set of negative and positive psychological responses—cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioural—provoked by the conscious awareness of ignorance about 
particular aspects of the world [7]. Building on this definition, we have developed an 
integrative, multi-dimensional conceptual model aimed at capturing the various cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioural responses assessed in past measures of UT (Figure 5) [7].  The 
model depicts UT as a reaction to the stimulus of one’s own ignorance, which must first 
become the focus of perception before further cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses 
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can arise.  The initial intervening steps from stimulus to perception to downstream 
psychological responses are moderated by various factors including characteristics of the 
stimulus, individual, and situation, as well as cultural and social factors.  The fuzzy borders in 
the figure represent the fact that the concept of UT can encompass any or all of these steps and 
responses; how broadly one construes the phenomenon depends simply on one’s interests. 
 
This flexible working definition and integrative model also acknowledges the dual nature of UT 
as both a state (a given set of psychological responses) and a trait (a propensity towards a set of 
responses).  With respect to the broader aim of promoting greater systematicity in research, 
this model also provides both a useful framework and road map for future research on the 
psychological effects of uncertainty.  It acknowledges that these effects are not only broad-
ranging and multi-dimensional (cognitive, emotional, behavioral), but both negative and 
positive in valence (Figure 5).  The model includes numerous responses identified in past efforts 
to measure UT; however, this list is not exhaustive.   
 
This integrative model supports a more nuanced understanding of UT—not as a monolithic, 
exclusively positive or negative set of responses, but a varied, adaptive mixture of both.  It 
proposes causal relationships that can be tested and incorporated in more comprehensive 
explanatory models. Yet many important knowledge gaps remain.  Uncertainty’s many well 
established effects in other domains of life need to be demonstrated in the health care domain 
as well.  More research is needed to elucidate causal connections between different types of 
psychological responses to different types of uncertainty (diagnostic, prognostic, therapeutic), 
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and the many person-level factors (sociodemographic, clinical, psychological, social) and 
situational characteristics (clinical circumstances, health care environment) that moderate and 
mediate individual responses of not only patients but clinicians.  These causal connections are 
undoubtedly complex; cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses to uncertainty likely 
influence one another, and their causal relationships are likely moderated by personality traits 
as well as situational factors.  More work is also needed to better understand the lived 
experience of uncertainty, and the ways patients and clinicians deal with the vulnerability it 
entails [82, 83].  To what extent particular responses to uncertainty in different situations—that 
is, an individual’s UT—can be improved is also an important research question with direct 
implications for patient care and medical education [7, 8, 84].  Finally, more research is needed 
to better understand how the interactions between patients, clinicians, and other parties—
encompassing both the communication of information and the provision of emotional and 
relational support—influence the effects of uncertainty.  A better understanding of these 
interactions is essential for efforts to communicate uncertainty—a final key focus area for a 
systematic program of research, which we will now discuss. 
 
4.  Communicating uncertainty in health care 
The important practical task of communicating uncertainty has long been a central concern in 
applied technical fields outside of health care, including engineering and meteorology.  The 
common need in each of these fields has been to communicate the level of scientific 
uncertainty about some specified outcome, so that people can take appropriate action.  
Probability, or risk, has been the primary language for expressing this uncertainty, and risk 
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communication has become an increasingly important endeavor and focus of research, which 
has extended to health care [10, 51, 52, 85, 86].   
 
Yet the scope of this research has been limited primarily to the communication of “aleatory” or 
“first-order” uncertainty, arising from the indeterminacy or randomness of future outcomes 
and expressed in terms of point estimates of probability.  Relatively unexplored has been the 
communication of “epistemic” uncertainty arising from either ambiguity (limitations in the 
reliability, credibility, or adequacy of risk information) or complexity (features of information 
that make it difficult to understand) [1, 12].  Epistemic uncertainty produces imprecision in 
probabilities, which can be communicated in various ways including confidence intervals or risk 
ranges; however, recent empirical studies and literature reviews have shown that epistemic 
uncertainty is rarely communicated in clinical practice or patient decision support interventions 
[87-90].  Emerging research, furthermore, has suggested that communicating epistemic 
uncertainty may reduce patient confidence, trust, and satisfaction, although these findings have 
not been consistent and more research is needed.[91-94]  Another limitation of past research 
has been its predominant focus on developing alternative methods of representing 
probability—e.g., quantitative, qualitative, and graphical [95-100]—and evaluating their effects 
on risk perceptions, knowledge, affect, and decision making.  Underexplored have been verbal 
clinician-patient communication strategies, as well as the effects of non-verbal communication 




An equally important limitation of past research on uncertainty communication has been its 
predominantly descriptive and empirical—as opposed to normative and ethical—focus.  Its 
primary concern has been the question of how to communicate uncertainty, as opposed to the 
question of whether it should be communicated in the first place, and if so, why [12].  This is 
arguably the most significant knowledge gap, which should ideally be resolved before—rather 
than after—engaging in efforts to develop and evaluate alternative methods of communicating 
uncertainty.  Patient preferences for information about uncertainty may vary [101, 102], as may 
the ethical justification for efforts to communicate uncertainty in different circumstances.  A 
logically and ethically coherent conceptual framework is needed to guide these efforts and to 
help determine the appropriate amount and type of uncertainty that should be communicated 
in particular circumstances, as well as the appropriate approaches to the task. 
 
Zikmund-Fisher has provided a useful way to address this need:  a taxonomy that maps 
different levels of precision in risk information to patients’ needs in medical decision making 
[11]. Precise, quantitative probability estimates are appropriate, he has argued, when the 
primary need is to compare the net benefits of two treatment options, whereas imprecise, 
qualitative statements of possibility are appropriate when the primary need is to simply avoid 
surprise or regret.  In similar fashion, one can devise a conceptual taxonomy that maps 
different uncertainty communication strategies to a hierarchy of goals.  Figure 6 presents an 
initial prototype that classifies uncertainty communication strategies according to different 
normative, decisional, general communication, and uncertainty communication goals, as well as 
different levels of informational precision.  It clarifies the logical alignments between these 
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goals and strategies, and thereby sheds light on ethical trade-offs involved with different 
strategies.   
 
At the highest level of the hierarchy are normative goals (patient autonomy, well-being).  
Logically subordinate to these normative goals are different decisional goals (deferral, 
maintenance or enactment of a particular decision), while subordinate to these decisional goals 
are general communication goals (to inform, affirm, or persuade).  The ethical appropriateness 
of these goals is dictated by clinical circumstances and the level of evidence supporting the 
intervention at hand:  deferring decisions and informing patients are appropriate when 
evidence is low, while maintaining or enacting decisions and affirming or persuading patients 
are appropriate when evidence is high.  Logically subordinate to decisional and general 
communication goals, in turn, are specific uncertainty communication goals; informing entails 
increasing uncertainty, while affirming and persuading entails decreasing it.  Finally, 
subordinate to uncertainty communication goals are different levels of expressed uncertainty 
(high or low) and informational precision (high or low).  The combination of these factors 
dictates the range of uncertainty communication strategies for any given situation—from 
disclosure of no information (high uncertainty/low informational precision), point estimates of 
risk (low uncertainty/high informational precision), or risk ranges (high uncertainty/high 
informational precision) [12].  Figure 6 indicates in bold some of the strategies that may 
logically align with specific higher-order goals; however, this list is neither exhaustive nor 




This preliminary taxonomy illustrates how uncertainty communication ultimately has 
instrumental value:  it serves specific goals that are logically, ethically, and practically related to 
one another.  It further illustrates that patient autonomy is not the only high-level normative 
goal—and respect for autonomy is not the only guiding ethical principle.  Patient well-being 
(the focus of the ethical principle of beneficence), for example, is another important, competing 
goal.  Of course, the relative moral weight of these and other goals in clinical care is the 
question that lies at the heart of many medical decision-making dilemmas.  Whether patient 
well-being can ever trump autonomy, and whether a “soft” or “fiduciary” level of paternalism is 
ever appropriate, are matters of ongoing debate [103-105].  A taxonomy cannot resolve this 
debate; however, it can clarify the competing normative goals and ethical principles that 
motivate efforts to communicate uncertainty in different clinical situations.  
 
For example, the widely promoted, idealized process of shared decision making (SDM) is 
justified by the normative goal of patient autonomy, the decisional goal of promoting 
temporary decision deferral, and the general communication goal of informing patients.  These 
goals, in turn, entail communicating uncertainty—and with a high level of precision—so that 
patients can acknowledge existing equipoise and make value-guided decisions.  SDM contrasts 
with the more paternalistic approach often undertaken in situations involving clearly beneficial 
interventions—which aligns with the normative goal of patient well-being, the decisional goals 
of either maintenance or enactment, and the general communication goals of either affirming 
or persuading, and either increasing or decreasing uncertainty.  Corresponding communication 
strategies range from no communication at all—which may leave patients with either false 
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certainty or heightened uncertainty, depending on their existing knowledge, beliefs, and 
motivations—to the use of relatively imprecise representations of uncertainty (e.g., qualitative 
risk categories).   
 
In real-life clinical situations, however, normative, decisional, and communication goals and 
strategies are not always so neatly aligned.  They are logically—not causally—related and thus 
do not always march in lock-step with one another, but co-occur in complex ways.  For 
example, prognostic communication to patients at the end of life is justified by the normative 
goal of increasing patient autonomy.  However, it is often undertaken in service of the 
decisional goal of helping patients not to defer but to enact specific end-of-life care decisions 
(e.g., to discontinue cure-focused therapies).  In these circumstances, accordingly, the general 
communication goal is not simply to inform but to persuade patients to consider alternative 
options.  The corresponding uncertainty communication goal is thus to decrease—not 
increase—dying patients’ uncertainty about the possibility of impending death, in order to 
encourage consideration of palliative vs. curative interventions.  The communication strategy 
that logically follows is to use precise point estimates of mortality risk to convey a dire 
prognosis with relative certainty.  The potential trade-off of this uncertainty-minimizing 
strategy, however, is psychological or existential distress—outcomes that may diminish patient 
well-being and lead clinicians to instead opt for non-disclosure of prognostic information [106-




This taxonomy requires further refinement and expansion to include other goals and 
stakeholders.  Nevertheless, we believe it provides a promising approach to clarifying the 
complex goal inconsistencies, dualities, and trade-offs involved in communicating uncertainty in 
real-life clinical situations.  In the case of prognostic communication in end-of-life care, for 
example, it reveals the fundamental tension between the normative goals of maximizing 
patient autonomy vs. well-being, and how communication efforts may sometimes be driven 
more by the latter than the former goal.  But it also suggests that different goals and 
communication strategies, although logically inconsistent, are not mutually exclusive and might 
even be optimized through specific communication strategies.  The critical empirical question is 
whether both uncertainty and the precision with which it is communicated can be optimized in 
a way that achieves an ethically appropriate balance between patient autonomy, well-being, or 
other high-level normative goals.  This is an important question for both clinical care and health 
policy, as efforts to disseminate shared decision making become more widespread [109]. 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1  Discussion 
Uncertainty in health care is an extremely important but incompletely understood 
phenomenon, and we have argued that a more systematic program of research is needed to 
accelerate our understanding of it.  We have briefly outlined some important knowledge gaps 
and key questions regarding its nature, effects, and communication, and have put forth a few 
descriptive conceptual models that may serve as useful building blocks for broader frameworks 
and causal theories that can help make future research on medical uncertainty more 
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systematic.  We propose these models not as final destinations, but points of departure for 
such efforts.  “All models are wrong, but some are useful,” as statistician George Box famously 
quipped [110], and we must acknowledge that our conceptualizations will always be imperfect, 
incomplete, and in need of constant refinement.  However, we cannot make the perfect the 
enemy of the good; we need working definitions and shared models in order to advance our 
understanding in an efficient, effective, collaborative manner.  This requires not a grand 
unifying theory of uncertainty, but a coherent framework that makes meaningful connections 
between models addressing different aspects of the phenomenon.  Exactly what such a 
framework should ultimately look like remains to be seen.  But its ultimate purpose is practical:  
to help researchers ask fruitful questions that will advance our knowledge of medical 
uncertainty. 
 
Much more work, both conceptual and empirical, is needed to identify and bridge the many 
gaps in our knowledge.  The question is whether the community is interested in engaging in this 
effort, and we believe that several activities may promote this cause.  One is to foster 
meaningful interchange and collaboration among researchers with different interests and 
perspectives.  Greater systematicity requires individual researchers focusing on different 
aspects of uncertainty to work together:  to acknowledge—and hopefully influence—one 
another’s thinking, and to engage in broader scientific dialogue.   
 
There are many practical ways of achieving this goal.  Professional societies and conferences 
can provide opportunities for researchers to meet and engage with one another, and to 
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exchange ideas.  The current paper, indeed, is the product of such an effort.  Working groups of 
interested researchers can be created, as fields including engineering and computer science 
have managed to do, and these communities could be brought together—e.g., through virtual 
and in-person meetings.  Finally, research funders play a critical role in influencing the direction 
of future work, and need to be engaged as partners in the broader effort of helping research on 
medical uncertainty evolve into a more systematic, integrated field of its own.   
 
5.2.  Conclusion  
Uncertainty in health care is a ubiquitous, complex, and important problem that calls for a more 
systematic approach to investigation.  Many barriers mitigate against this effort, but the stakes 
are too high to avoid trying:  uncertainty in health care can quite literally be a life and death 
matter.  As a first step in this direction, we have summarized key insights from past research, 
identified important knowledge gaps, and explored conceptual models that can help guide 
future research to bridge these gaps.  We put forth the current paper with the hope of 
engaging the broader research community in this larger effort.   
 
5.3  Practice implications 
A more systematic approach to uncertainty in health care can improve the clinical 
communication of uncertainty by helping clinicians better understand what uncertainties exist 
in a given situation, how and why they should be communicated, what the consequences are of 
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